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Building from the notion that learning occasions an `ontological’ violence, this paper
examines the ethical relations implicated in pedagogy and curriculum. In particular, it
explores ways in which pedagogy is rooted in a demand for students to alter their egos,
and, thereby, draws attention to the delicate nature of the teaching±learning relation-
ship. Appealing to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, it discusses how
ethical, non-violent relations are made possible in the day-to-day encounters between
teachers and students. A reading of one of Melanie Klein’s case studies highlights the
speci®c ways teachers participate in ego-alteration at the same time as they participate
in conditions for establishing ethical relations. The paper concludes with a discussion
of these conditions and the role that curriculum plays in responsible teaching.
Curriculum is central in educating students to become certain kinds of
people, individuals or citizensÐwhether such curriculum builds on
students’ own interests (Dewey 1969) or is based on state-controlled
outcomes (Wien and Dudley-Marling 1998). In both cases, there is an
underlying assumption about what it means to learn and be `educated’;
indeed, who educators think students should become frequently de®nes the
aims and purpose of educational practices. But what if attempts to realize
even the most progressive or open-ended of aims (e.g. through emergent
curriculum or student-centred learning) enact an inevitable violence upon
the very subjects being educated? In other words, what if learning itself
(and not curriculum per se) enacts an `ontological’ or `metaphysical’
violence (Derrida 1978)Ða violence which accompanies the very constitu-
tion of subjectivity? Indeed, if learning is the process through which each
individual being becomes a subject or self and, as such, is marked by the
pains, struggles, renunciations and frustrations that accompany such
growth and change (Castoriadis 1997), how might educators then think
of curriculum?
I examine these questions through a close examination of the teaching±
learning relationship, appealing to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas and the psychoanalytic thought of Melanie Klein and Cornelius
Castoriadis, in order to consider what is ethically at stake in asking students
to learn. In particular, I explore how the pedagogical demand for learning
also functions as a demand for students to alter themselves, to become
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di erent people from what they were prior to the learning encounter. Here,
I consider the ways in which the ontological possibilities of teaching and
learning are intertwined with the conditions for establishing ethical rela-
tions, conditions that enable a more fulsome consideration of the ethical
dimension of curriculum itself.
`Learning to become’ and the pedagogical demand for
altered egos
Pedagogy starts at age zero and no one knows when it ends. The aim of
pedagogy (or paideia)ÐI am of course speaking normativelyÐis to help the
newborn hopeful and dreadful monster to become a human being, to help
this bundle of drives and imagination to become an anthropos . . . . The point
of pedagogy is not to teach particular things, but to develop in the subject the
capacity to learn . . . (Castoriadis 1997: 129).
As a philosopher and political theorist, Castoriadis opens up the question of
pedagogy, of learning and teaching, to the conditions of a person’s becom-
ing. He proposes that along the trajectory of subjecthood, from one’s
beginning as a `hopeful and dreadful monster’ to one’s ®nale in death,
pedagogy turns on the ability of the nascent subject to change, to alter, to
become something other than what it was. The subject accomplishes this
self-alteration through its capacity to negotiate meaning in the world in
relation to the objects and persons around it. Castoriadis draws attention to
how subjectivity is instituted; that is, how the nascent human subject is
eminently pliable and is potentially ®tted into any social order into which it
happens to be born. But, Castoriadis is also a psychoanalyst and, as such,
speaks of the project of `becoming’ in terms of the development of the ego,
glossing the famous Freudian adage, `Where Id was, there Ego shall
become’. What it means to learn, for Castoriadis, is to learn to become
an ego, and it is in this process of learning where the subject is both shaped
by and yet resists the forces of social circumstance.1
Like Freud, Castoriadis suggests that `learning to become’ is an
inherently violent activity where the social environment exacts a traumatic
price from the psyche. The subject, through making symbolic connections
to its environment, must relinquish its own unconscious desires and drives
in the service of sociality. It renounces, represses and sublimates its `bundle
of drives’ in a struggle to negotiate with what is always necessarily `outside’
and `other’ to the subject itself. It is precisely through this negotiation that
the subject learns to take pleasure and delight in the external world, and
learns to control itself, as best it can, for the purpose of making relation-
ships to Others. For Castoriadis (1991), the psyche is, thereby, necessarily
`coerced’ into becoming a beingÐa social individual, an egoÐthrough the
social institutions (e.g. the family, school, and religion) that furnish the
subject with meaning, that impose limitations upon the subject’s desires
and drives.2 Yet, for Castoriadis, there is always a residue, a psychical
remainder that cannot be subsumed into the social order and which allows
for the possibility that subjects will make meaning and learn in unpredict-
able ways.
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In some ways, Castoriadis’ radical insight is both simple and familiar:
the subject learns to become a being in relation to others it encounters,
learning values, behaviours and modes of thinking within the nexus of
culture, language and social relations. However, rather than taking a naõÈ ve
view of this process, Castoriadis sees that this is an inevitably violent
demand society places on its subjects. Through social institutions, society
exerts a force upon the subject to become, for example, a worker, citizen or
consumer (or in other social-historical circumstances, feudal lords, peasants
or anointed kings). Insofar as education is a socializing institution par
excellence, what Castoriadis underscores here is not only the need to speak
of the violence in education, but the violence of education.3
Castoriadis’ portrayal is helpful for examining a major assumption
underlying education: that educators teach in the hope that others will
learn and change. Yet, at the same time, it challenges education’s inno-
cence. `Learning to become’ depicts well the ontological stakes in processes
of learning, both with respect to the bene®ts of change and the high prices
to be paid in terms of the coercive nature of subject formation. It echoes the
comments students often make when they begin to think and experience
their own lives di erently through new ideas, concepts, and relationships to
other people. It is not uncommon, for example, to hear even adult students
say, `I have never thought of myself this way before reading this book’, or,
`My life has changed as a result of taking this class’. My own educational
history speaks to such moments of elation. These declarations of change,
however, are often accompanied by statements of struggle in making a
relationship to a knowledge `outside’ the subject; students wrestle with the
otherness and di erence presented to them through the curriculum and
through the bodies of teachers and students they encounter. Reading
through Castoriadis’ perspective, such di culty suggests that there is
something profoundly at risk in coming to know, involving renunciations
and sacri®ces sometimes too great to bear. Students often feel that once
they struggle to know something, they can never be quite the same again.
And, as if this struggle were not enough, the process continually returns,
refusing to o er consolation for very long. Egos are not formed, nor are
desires done away with once and for all. The ego is never ®nished, but
always incomplete; not `an attained state but . . . an active situation’
(Castoriadis 1987: 104). This means the ego is continually vulnerable to
the potentiality of violence, to the recurrence of `learning to become’.
Pedagogically speaking, the simplicity of Castoriadis’ insight is decep-
tive, for, although it seems to depict, in a straightforward fashion, the
ontological possibilities of learning, it also highlights the ethical aspects of
learning itself, insofar as learning is accompanied by a certain violence to
the subject. To illustrate this point, consider the following example written
by a student teacher re¯ecting upon an experience in a grade 1 class:
At the beginning of the morning, children change their outside shoes to
inside shoes, take o jackets and place them along with their knapsacks on
coat hooks in the classroom cupboard. At 8:50 am, students are sitting on the
carpeted area of the classroom and stand for `O Canada’ that is announced
over the public address system. The students have been instructed not to
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move or talk. I hear crying from a girl that is standing at the back of the
room. The host teacher ignores the crying and continues to sing `O Canada’
with the rest of the class. I walk directly to the girl that is crying. I ask the girl
if she is hurt. She says, `No’. I then ask the girl why she is crying. She says,
`I could not go to the washroom because we can’t move during ``O Canada’’ ’.
I notice her legs are rubbing against each other. I whisper in the girl’s ear if
she is wet. The student says `Yes’. She cries louder. The host teacher
continues to stand and looks away from me as I look at him. I take the girl
and we walk outside the class toward the health room (Student essay,
December 1998).
Explored from Castoriadis’ point of view, the girl portrayed here has
learned to become a student who obeys the rules and procedures around a
particular activity. Part of what is demanded is that the student control,
however unsuccessfully in the ®nal analysis, her own desires and needs in
the service of performing a social ritual, the singing of the national anthem.
In her own words, what she has learned is, `I could not go to the washroom
because we can’t move during ``O Canada’’ ’. The ego here understands the
limitations and restrictions placed upon it by an external force: the school
routine, the teacher’s rules. She symbolizes that relationship in a particular
way, associating the singing of the anthem with bodily stillness and control.
Such symbolization displays a mode of understanding that incorporates the
coercive impulse of education, where subjectivity is forged within the
demands placed upon it, and, as Klein (1992: 221) observes, such sym-
bolism `is the basis of the subject’s relation to the outside world and to
reality in general’. The turn to language to explain her subjection simul-
taneously signals her entry into subjecthood.4
In retelling the incident, it is also evident that the student teacher is
struggling to symbolize her relationship to the girl, to the host teacher, and
to herself. By writing her scenario in the present rather than past tense, she
is doing more than merely describing un temps perdu; instead, her retelling
suggests an ongoing engagement with a past that continues to haunt her
present. The incident is not simply an event that has passed without
comment, like so many others that occur throughout her day, but partici-
pates in her negotiations of what it means to be a student and a teacher.
Does becoming a teacher necessarily mean learning to make certain
concessions to rules and routines that might be hurtful, at times, to
students in the class? A mature and thoughtful woman, she, too, is subject
to an event that has challenged her sensibilities, that is demanding of her to
participate in somethingÐand become someoneÐto which she is utterly
resistant, and from which she attempts to distinguish herself. The scene
crystallizes a certain understanding of the culture of schooling, and it is the
student teacher’s continual resistance to rules at the expense of human
relationships that marks her (ambivalent) entry into this culture. The
witnessing of the event provokes a crisis to which she responds by retelling
it as a story in which she is not like the host teacher: she approaches the girl
who is in tears, `disobeying’ the established rules and routines. In her
resistance, and in her attempt to work through the crisis this incident
has provoked for her, she in e ect splits teacher as an `institutional ®gure’
from teacher as a `compassionate person’. However, what is of particular
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signi®cance for my purposes here is not an interpretation of the content of
her retelling (e.g. the splitting, the distancing from the teacher), but how
the act of retelling attempts to capture her experience of learning as a form
of coercion. Learning to be a teacher at this point is akin to learning to act
like a teacher and, as this incident revealed to her, such learning is placing
certain (undesirable) demands on who she is.
The coercive force of education is here doubled: in seeking to articulate
a position for herself that can only be caught within the tensions of being
part teacher/part student, the student teacher o ers a narrative that both
reveals the violence of learning to become a teacher and the violence of
learning to become a student. The retelling, as a form of symbolization,
suggests, like the girl’s own symbolic articulations, that learning to become
(and the future toward which it beckons) can be fraught with anguish and
traumatic awareness.
There is, however, another moment present whereby the girl’s learning
to become a student and the student’s learning to become a teacher are
disrupted by another event: their relationship to each other. In this
instance, there is another mode of relationality in evidence. The interaction
between the girl and the student teacher inserts another possibility in the
girl’s understanding of her self in relation to the anthem and makes it
possible for her to imagine that there are other forms of social relation
available to her. Similarly, the reaching out of the student teacher to
inquire of the young girl’s situation suggests a capacity for a relationality
not premised on control or coercion. There opens up the potential for a
non-violent relationship, a relationship not based on denying or repudiat-
ing the student’s needs (bodily needs in this case), but rooted in a response
quite particular to the situation at hand.
In working with the idea that pedagogy is a process of `learning to
become’ that involves violence, I consider below the ways non-violence
might also be evident in pedagogical interactions. More to the point, I ask
what are the conditions for ethicality even in the face of such ontological
violence?
`Learning to become’ and the question of ethics
As the example implies, the idea that pedagogy is about the demand for
`learning to become’ crystallizes both the dream and nightmare of educa-
tion itself. On the one hand, it touches on the hope that people can think
di erently, can change the way they relate to each other, and can form new
understandings of themselves and the world that makes possible the very
act of teaching and learning. As Britzman (1998: 10) writes of education, `it
demands of students and teachers that each come to something, make
something more of themselves’. There is an implicit rising to the occasion,
as it were, a demand for a certain kind of being in the classroom. On the
other hand, the demand for `learning to become’ carries with it a great
burdenÐfor, if pedagogy is about the becoming of the subject, then it can
become a tool for the most oppressive ends. Questions of a normative
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nature inevitably arise: who is it that we, as educators and citizens, desire
people to become?
Philosophically speaking, exploring the place of ethics in education
often begins from this normative point of departure: what values are to be
invoked in educational encounters? How might students be educated to
become better citizens, more responsible moral subjects, or people who can
live and work better across social di erences? Simon (1992: 62) notes that
pedagogy is not just about the teaching of morals, but is itself a `moral
vision’. Normative questions are often central in helping to de®ne and
re¯ect upon an educational project.
However, posing normative questions has the tendency to make ethics
programmatic in its orientation to education: a set of duties or obligations
that if well-enough de®ned and well-enough followed will produce the
ethical behaviour desired. Bauman (1993: 20) remarks of men and women
living in a post-modern world, `we look in vain for the ®rm and trusty rules
which may reassure us that once we followed them, we could be sure to be
in the right’. Education is seen as a ful®lment or failure of prior principles
of goodness and rightnessÐprior, that is, to the actual face-to-face
encounters between teachers and students. In such an understanding,
ethics comes to education from the outside, it asks education, often through
appeals to empathy, or reason, or politics, or moral imperative, to become a
better practice, to think about how it imagines its ideals; it also asks
education to consider what students have to learn and how teachers and
students need to act in order to ensure the realization of such ideals. What it
often forgets is the uncertainty and unpredictability of the pedagogical
encounter itself.
But, what if one begins from a slightly di erent placeÐwith the `messy
and ambiguous’ (Bauman 1993 : 32) nature of human reality? What if one
re¯ects upon the failure and uncertainty of the demand for `learning to
become’? As Phillips (1998: 412) suggests, `people can never know before-
hand, neither can their teachers, exactly what is of personal signi®cance’; an
individual `picks out and transforms the bits [s]he wants, the bits that can
be used in the hidden projects of unconscious desire’. At the same time as
pedagogy demands that its subjects `learn to become’, in practice there is a
great deal of uncertainty and unpredictability to the pedagogical enterprise.
People bring a host of idiosyncrasies and unconscious associations that
enable them to resist, transform and create symbolic attachments which
pedagogy cannot predict or control. Could the host teacher, in the above
example, predict that the girl would so rigidly attach to the idea of bodily
immobility that she would forfeit her own bodily needs? It may not be
surprising, but is it a sure thing?
Instead of asking what education ought to be, what if educators ask
what makes ethics possible in education in the ®rst place, particularly in
light of the latter’s uncertainty and its ontological entanglements with
`learning to become’? What makes education receptive, perhaps even
vulnerable, to ethicality? Taking my cue from Levinas, who holds that
ethicality consists in the non-violent relationship to the Other, in the
particular relation the Self has to another person, I look at the speci®city
of relationships within the pedagogical encounter as possibilities for ethics.5
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Shifting the focus from education as a scene where one ought to apply
this or that principle, to a scene where the conditions or contingencies of
ethicality may be found, means no longer simply thinking about education
in relation to ethics; rather, it means thinking about ethics through educa-
tion. This means exploring the day-to-day details of pedagogical encoun-
ters to see what they might o er in putting forth an understanding of
education as a site of implied, rather than applied, ethics. To explore this
idea of implied ethics more fully necessitates reading teaching±learning
encounters for the way they promote conditions for ethicality as they
promote conditions for being, both of which involve relationships between
Self and Other.
Teaching as `bringing more than I contain’ and learning as
receiving
Levinas is helpful in ¯eshing out pedagogical encounters, for he centres
otherness at the very heart of teaching±learning. But, what he means by
`otherness’ is important to highlight here. It does not simply mean a
sociological other who is marginalized or maligned; nor does it simply
signify another person who, as a subject, resembles oneself. Simply put, for
Levinas (1987: 83), `the Other is what I myself am not’. In Levinas’ view,
Self and Other exist as radically distinct beings; the Other is not `like me’,
nor am I `like the Other’.6 Moreover, whatever psychical bridges a Self
does make with the Other, such as identi®cation or empathy, merely serve
to underscore the chasm that in fact separates the two. What is important
for my purposes here is that it is in the very break between Self and Other
where Levinas locates both the conditions for ethicality and the possibility
for teaching and learning. Like Castoriadis, in this regard, it is that which is
`outside’ the subject that provokes learning and alteration: the Other
ruptures a sense of uni®ed being.
Levinas (1969: 51) suggests that teaching is about staging an encounter
with the Other, with something outside the Self, whereas learning is to
receive from the Other more than the Self already holds.
It is . . . to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means
exactly: to have the idea of in®nity. But this also means: to be taught. The
relation with the Other, or Conversation, is . . . an ethical relation; but
inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching [enseignement].
Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings
me more than I contain.
Note here how teaching and learning are conceived as an ethical relation,
not because of some prescriptive injunction, but because there are present
two distinct beings who come face-to-face in an encounter. For Levinas
(1985: 67), teaching and learning, like ethics, lie in the `insurmountability
of the duality of beings’. The Other signi®es a limitless possibility for the
Self, and it is by coming face-to-face with such limitlessness that the Self
can exceed its own containment, its own self-identity, breaking the solitude
of being for the Self. In this view, teaching is only possible if the Self is
bringing more than i contain 437
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
7:2
1 0
1 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
open to the Other, to the face of the Other. Through such openness to what
is exterior to the I, the I can become something di erent than, or beyond,
what it was; in short, it can learn.7
This view of teaching as `bringing more than I contain’ is antithetical to
the Socratic method that so predominates dialogical approaches to educa-
tional practice in which teaching is viewed as `bringing out of the I that
which it already contains’. The latter is, of course, more familiar: a
pedagogy of recollection and self-knowledge, where the teacher as midwife
facilitates the birth of students’ knowledge. In the Socratic view, learning
happens almost in spite of the teacher. It is the skill of the teacher to elicit
that which is already `inside’ the subject, not the social encounter per se that
matters. The maieutic method erases the signi®cance of the Other, and
claims that learning is a recovery contained within the I, rather than a
disruption of the I provoked by an Other in a moment of sociality.8 Levinas
(1969: 43, ellipsis in original) writes: `This primacy of the same was
Socrates’ teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as
though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the
outside. . .’. In contrast, what is important to Levinas’ view is that it is
socialityÐthe encounter with the Other who is radically distinct from the
selfÐthat enables the self to learn and to change. By recentring the
importance of teaching, Levinas compels educators to think about their
responsibility in terms of this otherness, something that the Socratic view,
because of its emphasis on what is self-same, cannot. By posing otherness as
a condition of learning, Levinas’ view underscores the point that teaching
cannot abandon its ethical signi®cance or run away from the possible
consequences it generates.
Pedagogy see-saws between the `bringing more than I contain’ that
teaching aspires to, and the `receiving beyond the capacity of the I’ that
learning strives to achieve. Within this movement, of course, there are
many surprises and shifts, and the roles marked out for teachers and
students are not so rigid as perhaps they ®rst appear. Heuristically,
Levinas’ focus on the centrality of otherness to teaching, learning and
ethics lends insight into the demand for alteration pedagogy makes, and
enables teachers to begin to consider what responsibilities they have
towards those whom they teach. This is not to suggest that students do
not have responsibilities themselves; their capacity to receive and be open
to di erence is certainly an ethical response, according to Levinas. But, the
question that remains for educators is how, in the face of the violence
implicit in the pedagogical demand for `learning to become’, might they be
open and responsible to the Other?
Here is the crux of the tension. The subject can only become an ego if it
is forced to repress or sublimate certain wishes and drives in the service of
sociality; yet it must also be open, or receptive, to what is outside itself in
order for this to occur. Teachers, as the vehicles through which the
pedagogical demand for `learning to become’ is made real for students,
can not escape their roleÐthey require students to make symbolic attach-
ments and meaning out of the curriculum they present, and in doing so can
not escape a certain degree of coercion. It is not simply by repressing this
coercion, by convincing ourselves that education is simply not coercive,
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that those committed to the project of education will arrive at ethical
solutions which avoid this coercion. In fact, taking refuge in education’s
innocence denies the possibility of asking ourselves ethical questions, for it
is precisely because violence is inherent to `learning to become’ and because
teachers and students are continually vulnerable to each other in the face of
this violence, that the question of non-violence can even be raised. As
Levinas (1985: 86) himself writes, it is the potential to do violence that
suggests its own reversal: `The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to
an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill’. Or
elsewhere (Levinas 1969: 222): `Only beings capable of war can rise to
peace’.
For teachers, perhaps, participating in a non-violent relation to the
Other means having to become a learner oneself, opening up oneself to the
rupture of being that the face-to-face encounter entails. `The face is a living
presence; it is expression . . . . The face speaks. The manifestation of the
face is already discourse’ (Levinas 1969: 66). Ethicality may rest in the
teacher’s own capacity to be receptive to the discourse of the face, to hear
and listen for the meanings that students work out for themselves. Recall in
the example above how the teacher could not face the girl or the student
teacher; one can never know what motivated this turn away from the face,
but can simply note that in turning away, the teacher could not receive the
girl’s vulnerability, be open to the meaning she construed between her
body and the anthem, and, thus, foreclosed on the opportunity for
response.
Thus far, what is at stake here for teachers are two valencies of
interaction. On the one hand, there is the demand for `learning to
become’, where teachers have a social obligation to o er students oppor-
tunities for encountering di erenceÐto bring more than I contain. As has
been discussed, however, the meanings students make are not cast before-
hand, nor can teachers assume that ful®lling their obligations is not
harmful. On the other hand, there can be a receptivity to what is
unpredictably returned to the teacher: the meaning that students make
and the vulnerabilities that accompany them. What I am suggesting here is
that if educators demand that students make relationships to curriculum,
and if these relationships are always uncertain and open to failure, then the
place of ethicality in education lies in the failure of the demand for learning,
what Britzman (1998: 140, n16) refers to as `social, ontological, and
epistemological breakdown’. It is here, in the moments in which students
struggle for meaning, struggle to make sense out of and symbolize their
relationship to curriculum, in which teachers are called upon to be
receptive, that a non-violent element to the teaching±learning relationship
may be allowed to enter.
Klein’s (1992) case study, `The importance of symbol-formation in the
development of the ego’, outlines what this failure looks like and the impact
it has on the ego-development of a 4-year-old autistic boy, Dick. Klein has
much to teach her readers about her role as a pedagogue, insofar as it is her
function as a psychoanalyst to help the child make meaning and symbolize
his world. At the same time, Klein also o ers her audience a window
through which to see how this `brutal’ process is also in¯ected with an
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openness and receptivity to the vicissitudes of Dick’s vulnerabilities. As
well, the case study highlights the work in which Klein and Dick are
engaged when the demand for `learning to become’ is front and centre. The
study also gives educators cause for concern, for in asking students to alter
themselves, do teachers replay the students’ earlier struggles with ego-
formation outlined by Klein?
Learning from Klein and Dick
Klein’s case study is a foray into how the subject learns to become an ego.
The journey she embarks on is quite compelling, for Klein depicts not only
the di culties, trials and anxieties that face Dick, but reveals something of
her own role in inducing these di culties and her attempts at allaying
them. For these reasons, looking in detail at Dick’s ego-development may
help educators understand some of the structures that emerge within the
educational setting itself. Klein notes three movements in becoming an
ego: initial non-responsiveness; induced anxiety; and, ®nally, the turn to
symbolization in order to tolerate this anxiety.
Klein (1992) describes Dick as a 4-year-old boy who functions, in terms
of vocabulary and emotional relations to his surroundings, at the level of a
15-month-old child. He fails to communicate any feeling, and is now
thought to have been an autistic child at the time of his analysis. Klein
o ers an account of how the ego comes into being for Dick through his
ability to form symbols and make meaning. During his ®rst session with
Klein, Dick refrains from all outward emotional activity, be it hiding,
shying away, crying, or playing. He runs around Klein as `if I were a piece
of furniture’ (p. 222). Klein concludes her initial portrait of Dick with the
claim that `Dick’s behaviour had no meaning or purpose, nor was any a ect
or anxiety associated with it . . . . [His] ego had ceased to develop phantasy-
life and to establish a relation with reality’ (pp. 222, 224). She regards him
as being absolutely incapable of aggression, and he refuses to chew up his
own food, seemingly unwilling to even allow this little aggression into his
life. Although she continually reminds the reader throughout the narrative
that the child was a ectless and disinterested, she, nevertheless, also notes
his interest `in trains and stations and also in door-handles, doors and the
opening and shutting of them’ (p. 224)Ða point to which I shall return
below.
Because of Dick’s incapacity to symbolize his fantasies through play,
Klein (1992) notes that she has to shift her technique.9 Instead of focusing
on what the child acts out through his play, Klein must ®nd a means of
provoking play and, thus, symbolization and fantasy. `His lack of interest in
his environment . . . [was] only the e ect of his lack of a symbolic relation to
things. The analysis, then, had to begin with this, the fundamental obstacle
to establishing contact with him’ (p. 225). Her analysis becomes focused on
disrupting Dick’s enclosed sense of self, and she begins a strategy that, to
put it in Levinasian terms, brings him more than his `I’ can contain, or, as
Klein would put it, induces anxiety. This marks the second phase of Dick’s
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learning to become. The demand is the familiar pedagogical one, tinged
with coercion: to provoke the child into making meaning.
Klein (1992) takes the rather brazen step of placing two trains on a table
before Dick, stating that the big train is `Daddy train’, the little one `Dick
train’. This move acts as more than a provocation, appearing invasive and
coercive, perhaps even `brutal’, as Lacan (1991a: 68) would suggest. To
quote from Klein: `Thereupon he picked up the train I called ``Dick’’ and
made it roll to the window and said ``station’’. I explained: ``The station is
mummy; Dick is going into mummy’’’ (p. 225).
Dick then runs into the dark hallway between the entryway doors of the
room, and says the word `dark’. After repeating this several times, Klein
reports:
I explained to him: `It is dark inside mummy. Dick is inside dark mummy’.
Meantime he picked up the train again, but soon ran back into the space
between the doors. While I was saying he was going into dark mummy, he
said twice in a questioning way: `Nurse?’ I answered: `Nurse is soon coming’,
and this he repeated and used the words later quite correctly, retaining them
in his mind (p. 225).
However, it is in the third analytic visit where Dick begins to make a
sustained symbolic relation, marking the third phase in `learning to
become’. Instead of running between the doors after picking up the
train, Dick hides behind a piece of furniture and becomes seized with
anxiety. It is at this point that Dick, for the ®rst time, calls out for Klein to
come to him.
This is the turning-point in the analysis, the moment when Dick begins
to formulate a relation to the outside world, occasioned, according to Klein,
by his intense anxiety. This then leads Dick to an increased vocabulary and
heightened sense of emotional investment in Klein and his nurse. Indeed,
Dick begins to play, begins the work of symbolization. The work of making
meaning through play is a strategy that allows Dick to tolerate his anxiety.
The ego-work that Dick is engaged in brings with it the pain of having to
accept di erence, to receive what Klein has to o er him, which is always
already outside himself. As Levinas might say, Klein has ruptured Dick’s
own containment, pierced his own self-identity. Now, in a face-to-face
relation with di erence, Dick struggles to overcome (what Klein would call
a `working over’) the profound vulnerability aroused by his anxious state.
The analysis continues and Dick begins to act out his fantasies with
regard to his parents. As Jacobus (1995: 132) notes in her close reading of
the case study, at each turn, Klein, with `characteristic literalness’, gives
him `signs in exchange for toys’. Klein (1992) re-tells Dick what he is
doing, interpreting his play as he performs it, rather than waiting for
patterns of repetition to emerge in the play itself. This is how she describes
the modi®cation of her technique:
In general, I do not interpret the material until it has found expression in
various representations. In this case, however, where the capacity to
represent it was almost entirely lacking, I found myself obliged to make
my interpretations on the basis of my general knowledge . . . . I succeeded in
activating anxiety and other a ects. The representations then became fuller
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and I soon acquired a more solid foundation for the analysis, and so was able
gradually to pass over to the technique that I generally employ in analysing
little children (pp. 228±229).
Her technique centres on giving to Dick words that activate anxiety and
a ect. Klein believes that it is only through such crises that Dick can begin
the process of becoming. But, she also gives him something more. She
introduces him to signi®cations that come from the Other, and, therefore,
places him in a potential social relation, an ethical relation. Dick, through
his receiving `beyond the capacity of the I’, beyond what he is at present,
begins to make a relation with his own unconscious desires and con¯icts, at
the same time as he makes a relation to the otherness that is Klein.
This is crucial. For, not only does Dick establish a relation to the
outside world via a relation to the Other that is Klein, he must also establish
a relation to the otherness of the unconscious. What Klein demonstrates
here is that the latter relation cannot take place prior to the former. It is
through the Other that is Klein, through the social relation, that Dick’s
own relationship with himself is provoked. This suggests to me that it is not
only Klein’s words that are important, but the very presence of two beings
which conditions Dick’s receptivity of words.
But, what does this suggest about Klein’s role as a pedagogue? What
can educators learn from her? One can certainly see the `brutality’ of her
invasive strategy. At least in her recounting of the analysis, Dick is
continually pushed toward making a relationship to the words she o ers,
anxieties are incited, and she fosters sublimation through her abnormally
persistent interpretations of his fantasies. These are the key ingredients in
Dick’s developing symbolic relationships to his surroundings. `Learning to
become’ is indeed presented as a violent process, where Dick not only
struggles to enter into a social relation with the Other, but does so with
profound a ective di culties, evident in his calling out to Klein in utter
despair. But, even in this case, in which the violence of pedagogy, of
`learning to become’, is so transparent, there is, nonetheless, evident a
mode of interaction that swims against the current of Klein’s seeming
invasiveness, and it concerns Dick’s initial interest in trains, doors, and
handles.
There is no question that Klein brings Dick more than he contains, that
she `teaches’ him; she infuses the trains and doors with a signi®cation truly
`outside’ what Dick is capable of articulating on his own. As Jacobus (1995:
137) observes:
This all-too-literal naming is the glue that makes language `stick’ to the
trains, door handles, and `dark’ of little Dick’s imaginary. Klein’s words
`graft’ the Oedipus complex onto little Dick’s arrested symbol-making
capacity.
However, the `grafting’ only takes root because it already builds on a
nascent interest. Dick has someÐalbeit tentativeÐcapacity to begin the
work of semiosis through his interest in trains, doors and handles in the
®rst place. What is of note to education is that, in some measure, Klein has
been receptive to this interest and uses it in order to create a logic or
structure for Dick’s fantasies to take hold. Moreover, she alters her own
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technique, her own mode of symbolization in order to do so. She gives Dick
a social relation with a di erence, a signifying structure, to which he
attaches his fantasy life and works through his anxiety.
In some ways, Klein is receptive to the otherness Dick returns to her.10
She is open to working with the defences Dick presents, and, although
some people might say she errs on the side of giving Dick too much to
handle (pun intended), of creating excessive anxiety, what Klein is also able
to recognize is that it is Dick who has made meaning with the tools and
structures she has o ered him. It is in Dick’s failures to become, his
hesitations, anxieties, indi erences and non sequiturs in which Klein’s
openness reveals itself. As a psychoanalyst, she knows that Dick must
learn to tolerate his own anxiety through symbolic attachments, but also
knows that she has a role to play in bringing him more than he can contain
and, perhaps, more than he can bear to know. Hers is not a maieutic
method, where she is but eliciting that which Dick already knows, but a
pedagogy of provocation and disruption that responds to the speci®city of
Dick’s interests and needs. She listens for possibilities of slippage in
meaning, in the breakdown of communication, in the glances he gives
her, in the associations of word and action made through play, and returns
them to Dick, returns them through the discourse of the Other. I want to
return to a claim made earlier, that it is not the words themselves that
provoke Dick’s anxiety and subsequent symbol-formation, but the fact that
they come via the Other, via the presence that is Klein. To recall Levinas
(1969): `The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse’
(p. 66); and `Discourse is . . . the experience of something absolutely foreign
. . . a traumatism of astonishment . . . . This absolutely foreign alone can
instruct us’ (p. 73). It is just such a traumatism that Dick received, and one
which, in my view, all students may at times receive from their teachers.
Klein’s case study suggests to me that teachers, in trying to encourage
students to engage in meaning-making activity, take a number of risks, the
incitement of anxiety being a major one. What she helps educators to
understand, in my view, is the delicacy of engaging students in their
interests, in o ering them interpretations or theories of their experiences,
in providing for them a structure through which they might think them-
selves in relation to the world. Even when teachers do o er interpretations
and structures through texts, ®lms and the like, even when teachers refrain
from o ering personal beliefs, curriculum, none the less, largely comes via
the Other that is the teacher; it comes from that which is foreign, risking, to
echo Levinas words once again, a `traumatism of astonishment’. This
traumatism is not just about being `bowled over’ or being in awe of
something, but about being traumatized, about risking the security of
one’s self-identity, about facing the possibility of becoming altered. It is
precisely within this context of risk that the delicate nature of teaching
arises. But, what might attending to the delicacy involved in teaching look
like?
Klein, one could argue, employed anything but a delicate touchÐ
instead, forcing upon Dick her own prescriptive interpretations in order
to provide a structure for meaning to take hold. Yet, as I have suggested,
her interaction with Dick is not reducible to the words she says to him; she
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is also open, and, therefore, subject to Dick’s unique responses of fear and
anxiety. She goes to him when he calls; she plays with him when he enters
the analytic session; she responds to the looks he gives her; she talks to him
when he is at play and, at times, cuddles him when he is overwrought.
What teachers might learn from Klein, and psychoanalysis more generally,
is not a `laundry list’ of behaviours that replicate Klein’s actions, but a
concern to be attentive to the range of possible responses students generate
out of their own positions of vulnerability and to be sensitive to the
profound singularity of the situation at hand. The quality of one’s response
to another’s particular vulnerable condition is central and not merely
incidental to learning; this is particularly the case when teachers, as the
ones who `bring more than I contain’, are implicated in this very vulner-
ability in the ®rst place. Understanding teaching as a delicate engagement
means that the emphasis is not on speci®c strategies or behaviours for
`optimal’ interaction (this would be not unlike an applied ethics with a set
of rules to determine behaviour), but an attentiveness to the exposure and
riskiness students face in their everyday experiences of learning (more akin
to an implied ethics where the nature of interaction is found within the
pedagogical realm itself). Such an understanding means, on the one hand,
accepting the fragility of students’ identities as they seek to develop
meaning for themselves with oft-times heightened emotional intensity
(e.g. the beginning teacher who is genuinely fearful of the students she is
about to teach; the young child who anxiously awaits the teacher’s approval
for getting the right mathematics answer; the graduate student who falls
thoroughly in love with an idea). On the other hand, such an understanding
also requires acknowledging that one’s teaching, as a relation to otherness,
is precisely what provokes (but does not determine) such fragility and
intensity to begin with. The delicacy of teaching, then, with its emphasis on
responding to the unique Other, is at once a curricular and ethical matter.
Curriculum and ethical possibilities
Where does this leave educators in contemplating the possibility for ethics
in education? Where might this lead in terms of thinking about the nature
and place of curriculum?
I have explored what an `implied ethics’ might mean for educationÐ
that is, looking to the particularities of the pedagogical encounter, the
relationships between teachers and students, between Klein and Dick, to
see what might be learned from them regarding the ethical signi®cance of
education. Even within a pedagogy structured by a demand for `learning to
become’, a learning that, often under the rubric of `socialization’, is not so
innocent or painless as educators would perhaps like to believe, there is,
nonetheless, a place for ethicality. There are two pedagogical contingencies
that lend ethical signi®cance to an implied ethics for education.
First, there is the uncertainty of the pedagogical encounter itself, where
the meanings students create for themselves cannot be foreseen, where
`learning to become’ is not a seamless project of success. As Klein’s case
study demonstrated, it was in the miscues, associations and interests found
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in Dick’s play, and in his failures to become an ego, that compelled her
attention and responsiveness, that led to a change in technique. This
attentiveness to unforeseeable detail and meaning also holds for the
educational realm. It is from an `initial position of uncertainty’, as Stone
(1995: 184) suggests, that `openness, humility and trust’ become possible.
As teachers and students, we tentatively come together in anticipation of an
encounter of which we cannot predict the outcome; the exchanged looks,
the tones of voice, the artifacts of curriculum, the passion of opinion, the
indi erence to a question, the time and space to be negotiated, the desire
for love and recognition, all of this and more comprise the tiny, yet colossal,
details that shape and shake the ground upon which educational edi®ces are
built. Such uncertainty in our interactions carries serious ethical weight,
for, if such uncertainty is inevitable, then the quality of response to the
Other is rooted in shifting social relations rather than in solely abstract
adherence to ethical rules or principles. Moreover, in terms of an implied
ethics, such uncertainty compels educators to develop thoughtful
approaches to the Other, rather than carry out a set of pre-determined
behaviours that tell teachers `this is what you should do’. Although some
guidelines are unavoidable (and legally necessary), mere rules alone do not
assure ethical, non-violent interactions.
A second contingent feature of implied ethics is the relation the Self has
to the Other, which signals the importance of sociality and ethicality to
education and also highlights that it is through this sociality that a di erent
relationship with one’s self may be established. Words, information and
teaching are not disembodied within the pedagogical encounter, but are
made available through the Other and, as such, the encounter speaks to the
necessarily social aspect of teaching and learning. As I have suggested, it is
the potentiality of this relationship to do violence that makes it susceptible
to ethicality right from the start. Moreover, as Dick’s analysis revealed, the
kind of provocation and disruption to self-identity that the Other brings to
the I sets the conditions, in the form of anxiety or traumatism, for profound
alteration of the ego; anxiety itself becomes an otherness to which the
subject has to make a relationship. As a way of thinking about ethics
through education, the Self±Other relationship is crucial for understanding
how profoundly teachers can be implicated in the lives of their studentsÐ
often unwittingly, of courseÐand enables teachers to re¯ect on how their
everyday responses are always already ethically laden.
What I have been outlining here carries with it a tacit critique of the
Socratic model for education, whereby learning is rendered through a
process of dialogue and questioning. This midwife model is often a
cornerstone both for progressive and critical approaches to education: the
teacher is merely there to guide students to discover knowledge for
themselves. This appears to be a model of limited pedagogical intervention,
beginning from students’ own interests and building from there. But, what
is omitted from this account of midwifery or facilitation is how the
questions always come via the Other, via an Other that is not reducible
to the Self. The epistemological emphasis on self-knowledge blankets
over the dialogical relation as a social and ethical relation between two
non-synchronous subjects. Dialogical exchange is not seen to be about
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confronting otherness, but about eliciting the implicit knowledge the
student already has. Learning, thus, neither dislocates nor interrupts, it
merely gives de®nition to what is already there. One does not learn,
therefore, from teaching, from a relation to othernessÐas Socrates himself
remarks to Meno, `there is no teaching, but only recollection’ (Plato 1937:
82a, 361).
Instead, what I am suggesting here is that learning is accompanied by a
receptivity to the Other, by a receptivity to the di erence returned to the
learner through the practice of teaching. As Felman’s (1997: 28) commen-
tary on Lacan indicates, `Coming from the Other, knowledge is, by
de®nition, that which comes as a surprise’. In this way, learning occasions
states of a ect that are disturbing and, perhaps, painful, making teachers
and students incredibly vulnerable to one another. Being open or receptive
to the Other suggests a mode of relationality that may be very di cult to
sustain. My own position, however, is that responsiveness to the Other can
counter the harm wrought by pedagogy’s own demands for alteration.
Perhaps receptivity and total non-violence is not humanly or psychologi-
cally always possibleÐafter all, teachers have defences tooÐbut if educa-
tors are going to live well in the uncertainty of their classrooms and interact
in less harmful ways that respect the otherness of the Other, then are they
not compelled by virtue of their roles as teachers who do `bring more than I
contain’, who do provoke and disrupt the security of students’ selves, to be
responsibleÐto be responsive? As stated above, such receptivity does not
only concern the Other, but a ects one’s relationship to one’s self. In this
regard, part of the ethical relation involves an openness to considering one’s
own anxieties and defences and how they appear in the Self±Other relation.
At the risk of losing sight of the place of curriculum in pedagogical
encounters, what is recentred in this discussion is the place of teaching and
its ethical signi®cance. Indeed, I have implied that it is important to think
curriculum through teaching, just as I have been thinking ethics through
education. Curriculum in this view is neither just a cultural or political
instrument divorced from the concrete practices of teaching, nor a solip-
sistic rendering of personal or autobiographical knowledge. Instead, cur-
riculum passes through the very sociality of Self and Other, replete with
uncertainties and diverse contexts. Moreover, it is precisely because it
passes through this social relation that curriculum can become a tool for the
most oppressive ends, to which any colonial education will attest. It is not
only the `content’ of curriculum that matters, but the articulatory practices
through which di erence is symbolized (Todd 1997). From the perspective
of the learner, curriculum comes via the Other that is the teacher in the
form of new ideas, concepts and texts; yet the meaning he or she makes out
of such material can never be secured beforehand. As a feature of such Self±
Other interaction, curriculum lends substance to the process of `learning to
become’: it is the symbolic raw material that students use, discard or
rewrite in making meaning for themselves. Curriculum is, thus, funda-
mental to the symbolic elaboration necessary to ego-formation.
In thinking curriculum through teaching, curriculum also participates
in the pedagogical contingencies for ethicality already outlined: in both the
uncertainty of meaning and the Self±Other relation. With regard to the
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latter, curriculum cannot appear as a mirror in which students simply see
themselves re¯ected. This would, in e ect, serve to erase otherness, each
self looking only for its own re¯ection, reading texts and listening to people
to see how they are `just like me’. On the surface, this view of curriculum I
am elaborating seems to ¯y in the face of calls for a more inclusive
curriculum, where education is premised on just such a capacity to see
the commonalities between people, or when under- and mis-represented
groups seek to include curricular materials that more adequately re¯ect
their reality and with which they can identify. However, I maintain that
even in the face of such necessities in combatting social inequities, one
needs to be vigilant about what such curricular moves may be assuming.
For instance, mirroring responses may in fact collapse di erence within
and between communities. It is not that identi®cations are not necessary or
of no value to questions of community-building and for disrupting systems
of discrimination, but with regard to education, they alone cannot provide
the conditions for ethicality, for a non-violent relationship to the Other
where the otherness of the Other is left intact and unharmed. Instead,
seeing curriculum as part of a much broader practice of social (and ethical)
interaction suggests that focusing on more inclusive representation for the
purposes of identi®cation is not su cientÐand not only because such
meaning-making may go o in unpredictable directions. The implication
here is that curriculum needs to be more thoroughly considered as part of
the quality of human response between teachers and students, as part of the
delicacy of engaging students, rather than as a ®xed set of representations.
In terms of the pedagogical contingency of uncertainty, curriculum is
itself unstable, for it continually exceeds the bounds of its `content’ in terms
of textbooks, ®lms or literature. Instead, understood as partaking in a
subject’s idiosyncratic capacity to symbolize, in a subject’s unconscious
proclivity to make meaning, curriculum can include a wide range of objects,
thoughts, expressions, and a ects. As Phillips (1998: 412) suggests:
From a psychoanalytic point of view, I have my conscious preoccupations
and ambitions, and these make me more or less educable. But, I also have my
unconscious desire and a nitiesÐtropisms and drifts of attentionÐthat can
be quite at odds with my conscious ideals. I may go to a lecture on
psychology and be fascinated; but I may dream that night about the ear-
rings of the woman sitting next to me; which, if I were to associate to this
detail in the dream might, like Proust’s legendary madeleine, open up vistas
of previously unacknowledged personal history.
On another level, curriculum comes from outside the subject, but not
necessarily via the Other that is the teacher; rather it also comes via the
otherness of the Self, the unconscious. The play of uncertainty does not
merely lie within the teacher±student relation, but within a di erent kind of
relationship to the unconscious, as the preceding discussion on Klein and
Dick has revealed. What is signi®cant for curriculum here is how it at once
participates in ego-formation as well as in the subject’s creative capacity for
unconscious representation. Thus, curriculum gives form and substance to
the delicate relations that mark the process of `learning to become’.
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When one re¯ects upon the conditions of violence and non-violence
present in the pedagogical encounter, the question of what constitutes the
possibilities of response may seem easy to ask, but far more di cult to
answer. Unfortunately, the trauma of wetting oneself in front of the class,
or of witnessing such an event, is neither extraordinary nor rare. Yet, it
does seem to call out for a responsiveness that is at minimum both sensitive
and mindful of otherness. In exploring here some of the assumptions
guiding teaching practices and in asking educators to consider the uncer-
tainty of meaning and the vulnerabilities often displayed in the classroom, I
am well aware that teachers and learners are already stretched to capacity in
the hectic day-to-dayness of what it means to teach and to learn. However,
if teaching is not going to abandon the ethical signi®cance of its role in
`bringing more than I contain’, perhaps the work of an implied ethics
resides in teachers being able to live both within and beyond their means,
both within and beyond their capacity, simultaneously.
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Notes
1. For the remainder of the paper, I use the term `learning to become’. Although this is not
a phrase Castoriadis uses himself, in my use of it I am indebted to his broad
understanding both of pedagogy and of the ego as a social-historical institution.
2. Castoriadis (1991: 149) writes, `The minimal requirement for this process to unfold is
that the institution provide the psyche with meaning . . .’.
3. For a discussion on how education historically has performed coercively, see Block
(1995). Leavitt and Power (1997) o er a Foucaultian discussion of how children’s
bodies are disciplined in daycare settings. Both of these articles illustrate, in di erent
ways, the type of violence I am associating with `learning to become’. Although the
scope of this paper does not permit a full discussion of violence, it is important to signal
that this is neither a metaphorical usage of the term, nor one designed to erase the
di erences between speci®c acts of violence (e.g. neglect, humiliation, fear, abuse,
torture). My emphasis here is on the external force or strength that has the power to
subject, that compels people to learn and become. In this sense, education by its very
socializing function and by its mission to change how people think and relate to the
world, enacts a violence that is necessary to the formation of the subject (this is what is
meant by `formation’). In both the metaphysical formulations of Derrida and Levinas,
on the one hand, and the psychical formulations of psychoanalysis on the other, violence
is a necessary condition of subjectivity. The question is not so much whether education
wounds or not through its impulse to socialize, but whether it wounds excessively and
how we as teachers might open ourselves to non-violent possibilities in our pedagogical
encounters.
4. Klein believes, following Ferenczi (e.g. 1952), that identi®cation is a precursor to
symbolism (echoed and developed further in Lacan’s (1991b) understanding of the
imaginary and the symbolic). As will be evident below, however, Klein deviates slightly
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from this view in her emphasis on the primary role anxiety plays in both identi®cation
and symbolization. It is this emphasis that makes her work, in my view, central for
working through the anxieties attached to learning.
5. Cornell (1992: 62) o ers a useful de®nition of the non-violent nature of the ethical
relation: `Again by the ethical relation I mean to indicate the aspiration to a non-violent
relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes responsibility
to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny her di erence and
singularity’.
6. Levinas is proposing something quite di erent from Buber’s conception of the I±Thou
which is based on a symmetrical and shared subjectivity. Similarly, current conceptions
of the ethic of care in education focus on the resemblance and reciprocity between
ethical subjects, despite the fact that each subject may have a di erent role to play in the
ethical relationship. This is clearly contrary to the emphasis Levinas places on the
radical alterity of the other person whereby responsibility for the Other is non-
reciprocal and does not anticipate any form of mutual interaction.
7. I am following Levinas’ usage of `I’ and `ego’ to refer to the structure of being that
signi®es the totality of the self over time. While in psychoanalytic theory, particularly
that in¯uenced by Lacanianism, the I is a fundamentally di erent structure than the
ego, there is at times some slippage between the I and ego in Levinas’ work.
8. Interestingly, however, Socrates’ teaching, particularly that displayed in the Meno, can
be read against his own declarations. In his encounter with the slave boy, it is clear that
because of Socrates’ skills as a wordsmith he is able not only to condition the responses
o ered by the boy, but also necessarily participates in an exchange that is already
premised on gaping di erences and radical otherness between the two people involved.
9. This shift in technique really becomes a rede®nition of technique that seeps into all of
Klein’s clinical work after this time.
10. In Grosskurth’s (1986) biography of Klein, she mentions how as an adult `Dick’ recalls
Klein’s a ection to him in times of need. Klein, however, continued in her theoretical
writing to deem such displays of a ection as improper.
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